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Abstract:
This paper addresses resource valuation and the harvest decision of the firm under uncertain
property rights.  The results are extended to a market model.  The observations suggest that
policies addressing externalities resulting from poorly defined property rights need to consider
interest rates and price effects in structuring resource rights.Page  2
Property rights definitions improve as markets for natural resources such as air and water
develop.  This evolution of property rights facilitates exclusivity, trade and enforceability
(Teitenberg, 1996).  Markets and trade give rise to questions about resource value.  Buying the
right to pollute, to burn rice fields, to harvest fish, or use in-stream water rights are examples of
buying an option to utilize a resource.
 Option value is often used in the resource literature.  This concept is developed in both the
natural resource and finance literature.  With respect to resources, the concept has been developed
along two lines.  One is based on consumer theory and deals with existence value and certainty
equivalence measures.  Although work on this area proliferated through the 1980’s, a lack of
helpful measures resulted in waning interest.  The second form of option value, first developed by
Arrow and Fisher (1974) is known as “quasi-option value”.  This theory developed to include the
effects of uncertainty, and the benefit of flexibility on valuing a development decision. A third form
of option value exists in the financial literature.  In finance, an option represents the right, but not
the obligation, to buy or sell a stock at a given future date. This method also incorporates
stochastic measures into the valuation of the option.  In addition to valuing financial assets, option
pricing is applicable to natural resource examples as well.  For example, tradable pollution
permits, water rights, and fish harvesting rights may all benefit from this technique.
Each of these examples relies on a new specification of property rights to overcome an
externality.  By specifying property rights, firms internalize the costs of their decisions.  The new
property rules and cost implications change the investment perspective of the firm.  Established
valuation rules and techniques illustrate the investment valuation changes necessary under new
rights systems.  The Arrow and Fisher result illustrates how investment and use patterns must be
modified to incorporate uncertainty.  Net Present Value (NPV) analysis, a frequently used project
valuation method, overlooks uncertainty and results in over-stated project benefits.  A benefit of the
Black-Scholes option pricing model is that it directly incorporates stochastic elements into a
market-based valuation.
However, each of these cases assumes that property rights are well-defined.  That is, rights
are enforceable and exclusive, and there is no externality present regarding property rights and
resource utilization.  When well-defined-property rights do not exist, such as in an open access
fishery, the incentive is to harvest as much as possible, as quickly as possible.  There is no value of
waiting.Page  3
However, recent fishery management techniques, such as individual fishing quotas (IFQs)
represent an improvement in defining property rights.  By improving rights, there is an incentive to
postpone the harvest decision to maximize net benefits over time.  However, these rights are
harvesting privileges only.  The resource is still not owned until harvested.  This paper explores the
implication of uncertainty regarding property rights on the investment and resource harvest
decision of the firm.   The paper examines the benefits and shortcomings of potential valuation
mechanisms and presents suggestions for these tools under varying property rights regimes.
The six following sections develop these ideas.  Section two provides an introduction to the
empirical backdrop for this paper, the North Pacific halibut fishery IFQ program and the property
rights issues in this setting.  Section three presents the Arrow Fisher results relative to the IFQ
fishery.  This section clarifies the point that the opportunity cost of foregone future opportunity
must be included in today’s harvest decision.  The existence of property rights introduces a value to
waiting.  Section four develops a market application via NPV analysis that is developed to
demonstrate the value of waiting, and how property rights impact this value.  Section five considers
the applicability of the Black Scholes option pricing model to IFQ valuation.  Noting that ex-vessel
fish prices are critical in determining the value of an IFQ within a season, and that harvesters are
price takers, a special attention is placed on the optimal allocation of the harvest over the season.
Section six  considers the market effects of property rights and harvest timing on resource
allocation in a two period model.  The closing section provides the implications of this study, the
conclusions and further areas for study.
2.  The North Pacific Halibut Fishery transition to IFQs
In 1995, the National Marine Fisheries Service introduced individual fishing quotas (IFQs)
in the North Pacific halibut fishery off Alaska. IFQs are a harvesting privilege to an annually
managerially-determined total allowable catch.  They  represent a radical shift in the management
policy from an open access to a rights-based fishery, subject to various restrictions on rights
holders. This management transition provides an opportunity to explore the effects of open access
versus defined property rights on the resource investment and harvest timing decisions.
This analysis facilitates the exploration of two questions: how do IFQs change the value of
entry into the fishery, and, what is the market impact of IFQs with respect to harvest timing.
2.1  IFQs and the value of entry
Prior to the IFQ system, the halibut fishery season was limited to 2, 24-hour seasons in the
most extreme cases.   The harvest timing for the fishers was simple, harvest during the allotted timePage  4
period.  Since the implementation of IFQ system, the season lasts eight months.  Under this
scenario,- harvesters must allocate their IFQs(total catch allocation) across this time horizon.  This
paper’s model is based on a two period fishing season.  Now the decision is, given an IFQ what is
the optimal allocation of q1 and q2 between time period one and time period two.
3.  Arrow fisher result with respect to IFQs
The Arrow and Fisher(1974) result demonstrates that failure to incorporate uncertainty
into the resource use decision results in over-use in the first period. This insight is pertinent to the
IFQ valuation and harvest model.  Their result, based on the decision to develop a parcel of land, is
developed in this section under the fishery scenario.
Arrow and Fisher also show that an irreversible project or decision should include the loss
of the option for future use decisions.  In the IFQ fishery, fishing today means that one may harvest
less, or nothing (up to the IFQ amount) tomorrow.  The following example adapts the Arrow
Fisher model to an IFQ:
IFQ = total quantity of fish available for harvest
Q1 = total quantity (pounds) of fish harvested in time 1
Q2 = total quantity of fish harvested in time 2
p1= expected benefits, profits/pound from harvesting, period 1
p2= expected benefits, profits/pound from harvesting, period 2
c12 1 =- () pp  = opportunity cost of harvesting in period 1
For consistency with Arrow and Fisher’s analysis, let
w=pp p p 11 1 21 -=- - c( ) =net benefits after opportunity costs in period 1
Let event A be the case where p2>0.
If  A occurs, then the total benefits (TB(A)) of harvesting are:
pp
p
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If A does not occur (p2<0), the total benefits (TB(NA)) of harvesting are:
pp p 11 2 1 1 1 Q Q wQ TB NA -- = º () ( )
If Q1 >0, the expected benefits from harvesting are:
[] =+ - wQ IFQ Q 12 1 0 max ( ), p
If Q1 =0, the expected benefits from harvest are:
   [] EI F Q max( , ) p2 0Page  5
The difference of the expected benefits, when Q1 >0, versus Q1 =0 is, Hu, the benefits of
the harvest under uncertainty:
[] [ ]
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If, instead of uncertainty, we replace w and p2 with known numbers.  Then we have, the
expected benefits of harvest under certainty, Hc:
[] EwQ E Q H c 12 1 0 +- º min(( ) , ) p
If Hu - Hc < 0, this indicates that the stated benefits of harvesting under certainty exceed
the benefits of harvesting under uncertainty.  In a situation involving uncertainty, such as a fishery
where resource levels and market prices are stochastic, over-stating the benefits by assuming
certainty in harvest decisions will lead to over harvest in the first period.
Consider the following two cases:
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Case II: 00 22 >- Þ- < EE () () pp
Following the same steps as Case I, we get:
[] [] [] Ew Q Q EwQ E 11 1 2 0 +- < - min( , ) pp
In each case, replacing uncertainty with certainty overvalues the benefits of harvesting, and
promotes over-harvesting in period one.Page  6
4. Net Present Value under Uncertainty
Now that we have established that uncertainty must be incorporated into the valuation of
harvest to promote optimal allocation, consider the impact of this understanding using a financial
tool such as Net Present Value (NPV).
NPV allows us to consider the value of a discounted stream of future cash flows.  In this
case, it would give the value of an IFQ today based on the expected value of future earnings.
However, a short-coming of this method is that it takes future prices as following a known price
path.
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Next incorporate uncertainty into the valuation, put off harvesting until the next period,















y = the probability that prices rise in the next period
(1+u) = the magnitude of the price rise
The value of waiting is then, NPVu-NPV, or
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which is positive when y() 1 + u  is greater than one.
Now consider the question of property right uncertainty.  The most straightforward
approach is let y equal one, so that profits per pound increase with certainty by (1+u) next period.
However, introduce a new factor, g that denotes the degree of property rights specification.  Let
01 ££ g , such that 0 will denote the open access case, where property rights are absent, and 1
would denote a sole owner, or completely defined property rights.
















That is, in the open access case, when g equals 0, the value of waiting is negative.
Therefore,  it is optimal to harvest everything in the first period.
Now consider a no arbitrage condition.  That is 01 ££ g  and we want to ensure that
profits can not be made by disparities between interest rates and price changes.  Equate the trade-

























For example, when g <1, the ex-vessel prices are rising faster than the rate of interest.
However, given the uncertainty over property rights, it is sub-optimal to allocate the entire harvest
to the next period.  This model provides an interesting insight between property rights, interest
rates and price rises.  It is evident that as the rate of price rises increases, property rights
definitions can diminish, ie 
¶g
¶u
< 0.   That is, as prices rise more quickly, even with a low-




This relationship implies that as interest rates rise, property rights must be increasingly well
specified to engender harvest postponement.
5.  Financial Options, Value and the Harvest Decision
So far, we have introduced the concept that when there is uncertainty surrounding a
harvest decision, this uncertainty must be incorporated into the harvest timing model or over-
harvest will occur in period one.  We added to this story by incorporating uncertainty over property
rights.  This develops conflicting tendencies: to wait given uncertainty over future market
conditions, or to harvest now given uncertainty over future ability to harvest one’s catch.  The
NPV method inappropriately values the option to allocate harvest over time.  NPV omits the value
of flexibility and waiting for optimal market conditions.  The market extension of the Arrow Fisher
result is the options market.
Since IFQs are traded assets, options theory provides a helpful starting point for their
valuation.  Financial options represent the right but not the obligation to buy or sell a stock for aPage  8
given price in the future.  For American options, one may exercise this right at any time up to the
option expiry, T (the exercise date) (Wilmott, 1996).  However, theory shows that for non-dividend
paying stocks, it is optimal to exercise at the last possible time.  A simple binomial tree supports
this point (Figure 5.1).  At time zero, let the stock value equal $1 (S0).  At time one, it will either







t=1 t=2 t=3 
Figure 5.1
Note also that 1/u=d<k<1<u.  Since an option is the right to buy the stock in this case, k is
the agreed upon price of the stock at the time of purchase.  Therefore for (S-k) 
+    the option will be
exercised.  Now we determine the optimal exercise time.  In this example, let the interest rate equal
r=0, and there are no dividends.  The Black Scholes formula relies on a Qmartingale to form the
valuation (see Wilmott et al, Baxter and Rennie).  The probability that S goes up under the
Qmartingale measure is 
u
u () + 1
.  At t=1, if the stock value has risen, how does one decide
whether or not to exercise the option?  Given that r=0, one simply wants to see if u-k is greater
than or less than the value of the stock at t=2, under the Qmartingale.
The Black Scholes equation for the valuation of the stock in this two period example is

























. That is, the value of the stock at t=2 under
the martingale measure is greater than the value of the stock at t=1, and we should wait to exercise
the option.
There are similarities between an IFQ and a financial option.  Like an option, and IFQ
gives the holder the right, but not the obligation to harvest a given stock of fish in the future.  Also,
the IFQ holder must optimally decide when to harvest the fish.  However, the holder must factor in
two additional considerations.  The first is the property rights questions already raised in this
paper.  The second, is the market timing question.  Unlike options, it may not be optimal to waitPage  9
until the last moment.  If every harvester waits until the last moment to exercise the harvest option,
there will be a market glut and price will fall, as in the open access case.
6.  Property Rights and Market Allocation
The following discussion incorporates uncertainty over property rights into a market
allocation model in two time periods.







. d is the discount factor and equals 
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.  The inverse demand is given by
Pa b Q tt =- .
Now the individual’s problem is to max 
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.   That is, the single firm
maximizes profits (let costs equal zero) across time periods given a discount factor and a property
rights uncertainty.  Let the constraint be binding such that qi f q q ii i 21 =- .  Now the individual’s
problem becomes:
max Pq P i f q q ii i 11 2 1 +- d g () .
The first order  conditions are:
PP 12 0 -= d g .
As long as there is positive harvest in each period, PP 12 = d g .
Notice that if in the initial problem, g =0, then the individual’s problem is to maximize































The harvest will be allocated at the market level via the following:
Pa b q
Pa b q



























Given the no-arbitrage condition,  we must allocate harvest in each period so that the
present value of prices is equated across time periods.
ab q ab I F Qq -= - - 11 d g (( ) )
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Now consider the effect of g , the property rights specification, on the optimal allocation
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That is, as property rights are more well specified, more harvest will be allocated to the
second period.  Whereas, as rights are less well-specified, more harvest will occur in the first
period.  The extreme case is when g equals zero.  The market models indicate that the optimal
harvest in q1 is 
a
b
.  However, as determined in section four,  there is no value to waiting when g
equals zero.  The entire harvest occurs in the first period and q1 equals IFQ.  This is an example of
the market failure present in an open access situation.  This example also illustrates how improving
property rights specification facilitates the market mechanism for resource allocation.
7.  Conclusions, Discussion
The North Pacific halibut fishery transition from an open access to an IFQ managed
fishery is an example of how changing property rights effect both resource value and harvest.
The IFQ is a marketable right so determining an appropriate value is important.  This
paper considered traditional valuation tools such as NPV and showed that this framework is
inadequate given stochastic prices and uncertainty over property rights.   The discussion of the
Arrow-Fisher result illustrates that when uncertainty over future conditions exist, there is a value
to waiting to harvest.  The Black-Scholes option pricing model incorporates the stochastic effects
of the market into the value of an IFQ.  Given the similarities between options and IFQs, thisPage  11
model may be an appropriate beginning for valuing IFQs.  However two differences distinguish the
IFQ fishery from the options market: the market effects of exercising the right, and the uncertainty
of the property right relating to the asset (the fish harvest).
From a policy standpoint, the insights gained from this study aid in identifying the
relationship between markets and property rights systems.  For example, to manage negative
externalities, it may not be necessary to completely privatize or specify property rights.  The degree
of specification depends rather, on the relationship between prices, interest rates and property
rights structures such as tradability and enforcement.
Based on these conclusions, future study in two areas will be helpful:  1) identify and
model the indicators of the property rights framework affecting a resource 2) incorporate property
rights elements and market allocation issues into IFQ valuation.Page  12
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